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Article 4

MOTION PICTURES IN EVIDENCE
By CARL M. GRAY*

The development of the motion picture industry afforded
another method, to produce evidence, in the trial of cases.
With the development of sound pictures an additional method
was afforded. The bar, progressive as it is, took advantage
of the opportunity, to ultilize motion and sound pictures, in
evidence. This form of evidence was first attempted in 1923
and was rejected by the trial court. The bar was persistent
and made frequent efforts to introduce pictures in evidence
before it was successful. There is no question now about
the admissibility of such evidence when the proper foundation is established by competent evidence.
In considering the admissibility of motion and sound pictures in evidence, we should not lose sight of the fact that
the Courts, when the question was first presented to them,
did not immediately admit still photographs in evidence, and
when the X-ray was developed and offered in evidence, the
Courts did not immediately admit them in evidence. It
naturally follows, when motion pictures were first offered in
evidence they were not immediately admitted. An examination of the cases reveals that the Court exercised its usual
sound discretion in receiving motion and sound pictures in
evidence.
The admissibility of motion and sound pictures in evidence depends upon establishment, by competent evidence,
the proper foundation for their introduction. The Courts
have uniformly held, in all jurisdictions where the question
has been presented, that a proper foundation must be established by the evidence, before the pictures are admissible in
evidence. By proper foundation we mean, a showing by
the evidence, the manner in which the picture was taken, the
manner in which it was developed, the thing it portrays or
attempts to portray, whether it exaggerates or minimizes,
* Of the Petersburg Bar.
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the manner in which it will be projected or exhibited to the
jury, whether the projection exaggerates or minimizes or
shows the exact conditions as they existed at the time the
picture was taken. When the proper foundation is established
by the evidence, the Courts have held uniformly that motion
and sound pictures are admissible.
Before discussing the necessary foundation and necessary
proof to be made in reference to the introduction and projection of pictures in evidence, the authorities should be carefully examined. They show the trend of judicial thought upon
this subject in the various jurisdictions in the United States.
This is one legal question which has confronted the Courts,
which has resulted in almost a unanimity of opinion. The
Courts have substantially agreed that motion and sound pictures are admissible in evidence but have differed upon the
necessary foundation for their admission. Before referring
to the cases which have been decided by the Courts, in the
various jurisdictions in the United States, upon this subject, your attention should be called to the foresight of a
leading authority upon the subject of "Evidence," in this
country. I refer to Dean Wigmore. As early as 1923 he
foresaw the problem which would eventually confront the
Courts, as the result of the rapid progress being made in
the motion picture industry, and the manner in which the
public was receiving it. The decided cases disclose his influence upon the Courts and other authors upon this subject.
This is best exemplified by quoting section 798 of his Second
Edition of "Wigmore on Evidence":
"Conceding the verisimilitude of any particular photograph's reproduction of the object photographed, there remains always the assumption
that the object photographed is identical with the object in issue. This
assumption underlies, of course, all use of photographs, as it does that
of all other forms of testimony. It represents the element elsewhere
referred to as involving the principle of Authentication, applied to
chattels (post. Sec. 2130).
"(a) Now ordinarily the evidence to support this assumption will
be supplied incidentally and as a matter of course; e. g. the witness will
say, 'The front gate represented in this photograph, taken by me, is

410

INDIANA LAWF JOURNAL

the same front gate referred to by Witness X as the place where the
wagon drove in' (or, 'the survey line started').
"But it will often be desirable to establish 'prima facie' this assumption by more explicit or more ample evidence. This will be so where
the original conditions have concededly changed or disappeared and
where there has been an attempted reconstruction of them, by artificial
means, for the purposes of the photograph.
"Common examples of this are found in still photographs purporting
to represent the relative location of freight cars, gates, and vehicles, at
the place of a crossing collision; or of the alignment of machines,
windows, materials, and operatives in a factory-room at the time of
an injury. In such a case, there is always the possibility that the
bias of the party or agent preparing the scene and taking the photograph
has given to the reconstructed scene a misleading alteration, or has been
content with a reconstruction which was only as close as is feasible to
the original scene, but is put forward by him as actually identical with
it.1 Here the trial judge may require sufficient evidence of a substantial identity of conditions before admitting the photograph. But
instead, if any serious doubt exists on this point, the judge may well
cause additional photographs to be taken of a scene reconstructed as
the opponent's testimony alleges, if that is feasible.
"The foregoing element of weakness may reach its maximum in a
moving-picture. In so far as such a picture has any value beyond a still
picture, this value depends on the correctness of the artificial reconstruction of a complex series of movements and erections, usually
involving several actors, each of them the paid agent of the party and
acting under his direction. Hence its reliability, as identical with the
original scene, is decreased and may be minimized to the point of
worthlessness.
"Where this possibility is serious, what should be done? Theoretically,
of course, the moving-picture can never be assumed to represent the
actual occurrence; what is seen in it is merely what certain witnesses
say was the thing that happened. And, moreover, the party's hired
agents may so construct it as to go considerably further in his favor
than the witnesses' testimony has gone. And yet, any moving-picture
is apt to cause forgetfulness of this and to impress the jury with the
convincing impartiality of Nature herself. In view of these inherent
risks of misleading, the trial judge may well deem a picture unsafe
and inadmissible when the2 introductory evidence has not convinced him
that the risk is negligible.
1 A few rulings of this sort will be found in the citations ante, Sec. 792, n. 1.
Calif., Colusa Co. Superior Court (reported in
2 1920, People v. -,
Moving Picture World, as quoted in N. Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1920, homicide;
Weyand, J., excluded a moving-picture of a reconstructed scene of the parties'
conduct).
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"No general rule can be laid down as to the kinds of occurrences,
artificially reconstructed, in which the moving picture would have a
special risk of misleading.
But where the moving-picture is taken without artificial
"(b)
reconstruction, i.e. at the time and place of the original event (a possibility not infrequent), it lacks the above element of weakness and is
entitled to be admitted on the same principles as still photographs. The
only circumstance then to be considered is that in a few matters, such
as speed and direction of human movement, or relative size in the focus,
the multiple nature of the films requires special allowances of error
to be made; but these allowances are no different in kind from the
' 3
elements of error inherent under certain conditions in still photographs.

This same subject was discussed fully in "Cyclopedia of
Automobile Law and practice," by Blashfield, (Vol. 9, pages
643-647, Permanent Edition 1935), in the following sections :4
MOVING PICTURES AS PHOTOGRAPHS

"Just as the map and engineer's diagram succeeded the rough sketch
and as the photograph succeeded the diagram and map, so it appears
that the ultimate in legal photography has been reached with the use
of moving pictures in accident cases and the approach of aerial photography to a similar purpose. That moving pictures come within the
definition of photographs and are subject to the same rules of evidence
seems to be established in judicial minds.
"Courts recognize the duty of using every means for discovering
the truth, reasonably calculated to aid in that regard. In the performance of that duty, every new discovery, when it shall have passed
beyond the experimental stage, is necessarily treated as a new aid 'in
the administration of justice, in the field covered by it. In that view,
courts show no hesitation, in proper cases, in availing themselves of
moving pictures and aerial photography just as they availed themselves
of the art of photography by the X-ray process."
ADMISSIBILITY WITHIN DISCRETION OF COURT

"Recent cases acknowledge that the well-known progress being made
in the moving picture world has resulted in great accuracy in depicting
the true conditions sought to be shown and that the mechanical means
3 1920, Algeri v. Cleveland R. Co., Cleveland Common Pleas (as reported

in Cleveland Plaindealer, May 13, 1920; personal injury; to disprove plaintiff's
alleged incapacity, a moving-picture of the plaintiff at work as a bricklayer
since the date of the injury was received, by Hay, J.).
4 The footnotes cited in Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice by
Blashfield were omitted.
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of perfecting such pictures have become so general that it may become
necessary in the near future to permit their introduction in evidence. It
is admitted, however, that in many cases the pictures may not only have
a bearing upon the facts, but may be absolutely decisive on the issues
involved in the action.
"It is not yet settled, however, as to whether the separate still
pictures taken on a film are the proper evidence or whether the machine
itself may be installed and an exhibition made before the jury. The
rule against stage setting and posed photography mitigates against such
demonstrations. Another equally potent reason for rejecting such
ocular demonstrations is the impossibility of including them in a record
for review; there being no rule as yet for incorporating action in a
written or printed record. The rules applied as to photographic exhibits,
rejecting pictures of moving animate objects, hereinabove stated, are
likewise opposed to the extension of the rule so as to permit the admission of moving pictures.
"Some of these considerations, doubtless, moved the court in Gibson
v. Gunn to reject moving pictures because of the abuse of this form
of evidence, in bringing before the jury irrelevant matter, hearsay,
and incompetent evidence and tending to make a farce of the trial.
In that case, the admission of a moving picture of plaintiff's performance
of a vaudeville entertainment prior to the accident in which the injury
was sustained constituted reversible error. Aside from the fact that
moving pictures present a fertile field for the exaggeration of any
emotion or action, and the absence of evidence as to how the particular
picture film was prepared, the court of review was of the opinion that
the exhibition made a farce of the trial, since the plaintiff's ability as
a vaudeville performer was not in issue and his eccentric dancing,
coric songs, and the dialogue and remarks of his fellow performers
had no place in the trial. The court therefore regarded the admission
of a moving picture in evidence as a radical departure from the rules
of evidence.
"In another well-known case, counsel for the defeated party asked
to install in the courtroom a moving picture apparatus so that he
might exhibit on the screen a picture of a car in motion on the track
at or near the point of the accident. He was not permitted to do so.
The picture of the car which he wished to exhibit was not a picture
of the one in which the decedent was a passenger at the time of the
accident, but was a picture subsequently taken of another car. The
purpose of the evidence was to show that all the cars that came around
the curve swayed. The court concluded that in the moving picture
the car might possibly have swayed more than the one in which the
accident took place, because of greater speed. Furthermore, it was
suggested that the rapidity of the movement or sway of the car appearing on the screen was subject to the manipulation of the camera-
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man who took the picture of the car. The court was of the opinion
that it was within the power of the operator to make the movements
appear faster or slower than the car was actually going, that questions
of convenience and possible confusion in the courtroom might and
might not be used advantageously and properly in placing the facts
before juries is a question the answer to which must vary with one
case and another, so that the decision in each case must be left largely
to the judgment and discretion of the trial court without any restricting
general formula laid down to control it. In the particular case above
referred to, there were other available means of proving with accuracy
the movements of the car, and the court of review was of the opinion
that the trial court properly excluded the resort to moving pictures.
"Dean Wigmore, in his second edition on Evidence, came to the
conclusion that moving pictures are to be admitted on the same principles as still photographs, that the only circumstance to be considered
is that, in a few matters, such as speed and direction of human movement or relative size in the focus, the multiple nature of the films
requires special allowances of error to be made, but that these allowances are no different in kind from the elements of error inherent under
certain conditions in still photographs. So he concludes that moving
pictures are admissible, providing the requisite precautions are followed by the presiding judge, and that, if they have any tendency to
exaggerate any of the true features sought to be proved, that situation
may be met and properly disposed of by the court, but that, when
proper safeguards are followed, no harm can come from the introduction of such pictures."
WHEN MOVING PICTURES ADMITTED
"While it seems to be well established that a moving picture of the
location of the place of an accident, taken after the accident, may
only be admitted when it can be shown without question that the
conditions are the same as those existing at the time of the accident,
such pictures of the plaintiff, taken while walking along a public street,
have been held admissible when offered to impeach or discredit the
testimony of the plaintiff by showing that, at the particular time the
picture was taken, after the accident, he conducted himself as a perfectly well man, instead of the invalid he claimed to be. In other words,
a New York court was of the opinion that such pictures should be
shown to the jury to enable them to pass intelligently upon the question
whether the condition claimed to exist was real or feigned.
"The court of last resort of Texas, however, arrived at a different
conclusion, and refused to permit the introduction of motion pictures,
offered to show that the claims of the plaintiff as to total disability
were true. The rejection in that instance was on the ground that
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the pictures were not properly identified nor their correctness shown.
The reviewing court pointed out, however, that the bill of exceptions
did not contain the pictures nor show what they would disclose nor
how the pictures were to be exhibited to the jury. Commenting on
the matter, the court said: 'It is a matter of common knowledge that
pictures showing a person in action may be made very deceptive by the
operator of the machine used in taking the picture. The subject of
the pictures in this instance was before the jury, and the nature and
extent of his injuries were fully inquired into. He admitted doing
the only labor which appellant relied on to disprove the claim of total
disability. We think the court correctly refused to admit the pictures.'
"There are apparent reasons for rejecting such evidence where the
question of speed or proper control of an automobile may be involved.
Any one having witnessed a moving picture and seen the harrowing
escapes of occupants of automobiles in close places, through the manipulation of the camera, can come to no other conclusion. Still pictures,
however, made from the movie films, may be more appropriately admitted in connection with the testimony of eye-witnesses, and even they
are subject to various interpretations. Recently a newspaper published a photographic reproduction of an automobile skidding on the
pavement, striking and killing a woman and injuring a child which
she was wheeling in a baby carriage across a slippery street. The
writer made a test of several persons by exhibiting these photographic
reproductions and asking for a reading of them. Not a single person
tested gave a proper interpretation of the occurrence. Some thought
the wonn in the first picture was pushing the automobile to assist
in getting it started. Not one of those tested concluded rightly that
the car was skidding.
"It is apparent that the speed of a car and the ability to stop when
the driver should have observed the imminent danger to the pedestrian
would be issues in such a case. The movie camera might be manipulated
either by fast or slow motion and thereby convey to the jury vastly
misleading suggestions on the identical questions in issue."
In referring to the cases upon this proposition, it is desirable to examine the cases in the order in which they were
decided by the Court.5 No doubt many cases were presented
to the lower courts, where pictures were admitted in evidence,
which were not appealed and reported.

The first reported

5 The West Publishing Company deals with this subject under the following key numbers. Ind. and Northeastern Digest Decimal and General Digests
Evidence 359, 380, 382; Criminal Law 206(1), 393(1), 419(1), 438, 538(3),
662(4), 736(2); Witnesses 227, 266; Constitutional Law 266.
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case upon this subject is the case of Pandolfo v. U. S., 286
Fed. 8, 16 (Aug. 21, 1922), Circuit Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit. Pandolfo was indicted with others for a
conspiracy to defraud by use of the mails.
The company had buildings located at St. Cloud, Minnesota. The defendant had one Forsyth, the advertising manager for the company, take motion pictures of the factory
at St. Cloud, and attempted to introduce the film in evidence after making the proof, showing in what manner the
pictures were taken and what they represented and that they
were correct. The Court indicated that the pictures would
be admitted in evidence until it developed that they were
taken by the company's advertising manager. When this fact
was disclosed, the Court rejected the pictures. Some seventyfive still photographs had been introduced in evidence showing the machinery contained in the factory, and detailed
description had also been introduced in evidence. The Court,
in refusing the motion pictures, had the following to say:
"The motion pictures would not amplify this, beyond showing the
movement of the machinery and the action of the employees, at the
particular time of the making of the film. The fact of operation, and
manner thereof, were not at all in dispute, and the question of permitting the motion pictures to be displayed before the jury was so far
within the discretion of the court, that, while it might not have been
error to have received it, it was not error to exclude it."

The next case upon this subject is the case of Gibson v.
Gunn, 202 N. Y. S. 19, 206 App. Div. 464, (Nov. 2, 1923):
"Appeal by the defendant, Basil H. Gunn, from a judgment of
the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of
the clerk of the county of Kings on the 11th day of October, 1922,
upon the verdict of a jury for $10,000, and also from an order entered
in said clerk's office on the 18th day of October, 1922, denying the
defendant's motion for a new trial made upon the minutes. This is
an action to recover for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff
when he was struck by defendant's automobile. Prior to the accident,
the plaintiff, who was a vaudeville dancer and performer, lost his
left foot, which was amputated about five inches above the ankle. He
procured an artificial leg and was able to continue his career as a
theatrical dancer and performer. His vaudeville act opened with a
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motion picture, which was exhibited to the jury on the trial over the
objection of defendant's counsel. In this picture there was first
projected on the screen a poem, and then the picture showed the
plaintiff on crutches walking along the street. He stopped in front
of a shop, and looked at a row of artificial limbs in a window. Then
the picture showed him entering the shop, and later leaving it and
walking down the stairs and up the street. The next scene showed the
plaintiff meeting two friends, who were dancers, and who did certain
tricks, which the plaintiff imitated, and in addition did stunts himself,
which the others refused to attempt, because they were too hard."

"PER CURIAM. We think the introduction in evidence, over defendant's objections and exceptions, of a moving picture of plaintiff's
performance in a vaudeville entertainment prior to the accident in
which the injury was sustained, constituted reversible error. Aside from
the fact that moving pictures present a fertile field for exaggeration of
any emotion or action, and the absence of evidence as to how this
particular motion picture film was prepared, we think the picture
admitted in evidence brought before the jury irrelevant matter, hearsay and incompetent evidence, and tended to make a farce of the trial.
"The plaintiff's ability as a vaudeville performer was not the issue,
and his eccentric dancing, comic songs, and the dialogue and remarks
of his fellow performers, had no place in the trial in the Supreme Court
of the state of the issues presented by the pleadings. The effect of this
radical departure from the rules of evidence is found in the excessive
verdict returned by the jury. The judgment should be reversed upon
the law and the facts, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide
the event.
"Judgment and order reversed upon the law and the facts, and new
trial granted, with costs to abide the event."

The next case is the case of DeCamp v. U. S., 10 Fed. (2d)
984 (Court of Appeal of the District of Columbia, decided

January 4, 1926).

The appellant, DeCamp, appealed from

a conviction under an indictment charging him and others
of the crime of conspiring to use the mails in furtherance of
a scheme to defraud in connection with the promotion and
sale of the capital stock of the Crystal Glass Casket Com-

pany, a corporation.
6 See 2 New York Law Review 96.
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"Error is assigned on the admission and exclusion of certain evidence. It appears that a reel of motion pictures was taken at the
company's plant in Oklahoma, purporting to show the actual manufacture, in all stages, of glass caskets of different sizes. Defendants
offered the reel in evidence, and moved the court for permission to
exhibit the pictures to the jury by a moving picture machine in the
courtroom. The court denied the motion and declined to permit the
exhibition to be made to the jury. One of the principal criminating
charges of the government in this case was that glass caskets could
not be made, and evidence was introduced to sustain this contention.
It was to meet this evidence that the moving picture was produced and
offered. We think the court was right in refusing to admit the
picture in evidence. A motion picture does not of itself prove an actual
occurrence. The thing reproduced must be established by the testimony
of witnesses. While the photograph may be a proper representation
of the thing produced, yet the testimony of witnesses is required to
verify the production. 'Theoretically, of course, the moving picture
can never be assumed to represent the actual occurrence; what is seen
in it is merely what certain witnesses say was the thing that happened,
and, moreover, the party's hired agents may so construct it as to go
considerably further in his favor than the witnesses' testimony has
gone, and yet any moving picture is apt to cause forgetfulness of this,
and to impress the jury with the convincing impartiality of Nature
herself. In view of these inherent risks of misleading, the trial judge
may well deem a picture unsafe and inadmissible, when the introductory
evidence has not convinced him that the risk is negligible.' 2 Wigmore
on Evidence, Sec. 798."
The next case in point of time is the case of Massachusetts

Bonding and Ins. Co. v. WForthy (Texas, Aug. 11, 1928; rehearing denied Oct. 4, 1928), 9 S. W. (2d) 388, 393.
"Among the errors assigned is the refusal of the court to permit
the appellant to introduce in evidence and exhibit to the jury pictures
of the plaintiff in action, such as are commonly called 'motion pictures.'
It is stated in the assignment that those pictures would have conclusively
shown that the claims of the plaintiff as to total disability were untrue.
The court refused to permit the introduction of those pictures, apparently upon the ground that they were not properly identified or their
correctness shown. We are not prepared to say that the court abused
his discretion in ruling as he did. The bills of exception do not
contain the pictures, nor show what they would disclose; nor do the
bills of exception show how the pictures were to be exhibited to the
jury. It is a matter of common knowledge that pictures showing
a person in action may be made very deceptive by the operator of
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the machine used in taking the pictures. The subject of the pictures
in this instance was before the jury, and the nature and extent of
his injuries were fully inquired into. He admitted doing the only
labor which appellant relied on to disprove the claim of total disability.
We think the court correctly refused to admit the pictures. Gibson
v. Gunn, 206 App. Div. 464, 202 N. Y. S. 19; Rodick v. Ry. Co., 109
Me. 530, 85 A. 41; 22 Corpus Juris, 914."
The next case in point of time is the case of State of Mary-

land for the Use of 4nna Chima, Appellant, v. United Railways and Electric Company of Baltimore (April 15, 1932),
Maryland Court of Appeals, 162 Md. 404, 159 At. 916, 83
A. L. R. 1307.
"This leaves only the second exception to the evidence to be considered and passed upon. In this exception, the appellant's counsel
asked to install in the courtroom a moving picture apparatus so that
he might exhibit on the screen a picture of a car in motion on the
track at or near the point of the accident, but was not permitted to do
so. The picture of the car which he wished to exhibit was not a
picture of the car in which the decedent was a passenger at the time
of the accident, but a picture of a car subsequently taken. As stated
by the counsel this evidence 'was for the purpose of showing that all
cars that come around there (the curve) sway.' The only purpose
for which such testimony could possibly be admissible would be to
show that the sway of the car was unusual or extraordinary, and it
seems not improbable that this could not be shown by the movements
of a car other than the one in which the accident occurred. In the
moving picture, the car, because of greater speed, might possibly have
swayed more than the car in which the accident took place. If so,
the sway of that car could not be relied upon as representing the
movements of the car in question. Moreover, the rapidity of the
movement or the sway of the car appearing on the screen was subject
to the manipulation of the cameraman who took the picture of the car.
It was within his power to make the movements appear faster or slower
than the car was actually going. Questions of convenience and possible
confusion in the courtroom might have to be considered. When moving pictures might and might not be used advantageously and properly
in placing the facts before juries is a question the answer to which
must vary with one case and another, and we think the decision in
each case must be left largely to the judgment and discretion of the
presiding judge, without any restricting general formula laid down to
control him. In this case there were other available means of proving
with accuracy the movements of the car, and we do not see any ground
for holding that the court acted erroneously in excluding the resort to
moving pictures."
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The next case is the case of Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of
Californiav. Marks (Ala. May 23, 1935), 161 So. 543-545.
"The trial court permitted the introduction in evidence of certain
photographs taken by the plaintiff, and of him taken by another when
in Arizona. The defendant then made an effort to have them reproduced or displayed upon a screen in the courthouse. There is no question but what moving pictures have reached a marvelous degree of
production and reproduction, not only accurately, but often in a most
exaggerated form; the accuracy depending largely upon conditions,
etc., of the camera when the first impression is taken. It also appears
that motion pictures have been received in evidence in many courts
when a proper predicate has been established, Wigmore on Evidence
(Supp. to 2d Ed.), Sec. 7 98a, wherein the question is discussed and
the essentials of a sufficient predicate are outlined. It is sufficient to
say, however, that the examination of defendant's witness, Bromberg,
was such as to fail to establish the fact that the reproduction by him
of the photographs on the screen could be done with such accuracy as
to put the trial court in error for rejecting this offered evidence. The
pictures were not authenticated, and Bromberg's testimony shows that
whether a motion picture accurately reflected the movements of the
object taken depends on the speed at which the camera is operated
during the exposure; that the matter of speed of motion will depend
upon the speed at which the camera was set in Arizona; and that
he did not know and had no way of definitely ascertaining the speed,
and there was no evidence as to the speed at which the camera was set
at the time the pictures were taken. Nor did the testimony of the
plaintiff, Marks, help matters. While he owned the camera, and took
some of the pictures, the ones in which he appeared, and the only ones
of any relevancy, were taken by another and he did not know just how
the speed was set when the pictures of him were taken."

The next case is that of Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace
Shows Co. (R. I. May 8, 1937), 192 Atl. 158, 160:
"The defendant's twelfth exception is to the refusal of the trial
justice to declare a mistrial and take the case from the jury on the
ground that they had been permitted to view the showing of a certain
motion picture in which the plaintiff Mr. Owens and his trained
horse had taken part. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the
showing of this picture was material and proper by way of answer
to one of the pleas filed by the defendant. This plea, in substance,
alleged that the contract, which was the basis of this action, was
obtained from the defendant by the fraud and misrepresentation of the
plaintiffs in connection, among other things, with their appearances
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in numerous moving pictures in which, the plaintiffs claimed, they and
their horse had been featured.
"In pressing the above exception, the defendant has attempted to
have us pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the trial justice in
permitting the jury to view this picture. This unusual procedure
should be resorted to, if at all, with extreme caution. If for any
reason it should ever become necessary and proper for a jury to view
a moving picture during the course of a trial, it should be made to
appear clearly to the trial justice that the picture was a true reproduction of the scene photographed and was properly authenticated according
to the rules of evidence. Otherwise, because of the skill and development in the fabrication of moving pictures and the possibilities of
producing desired effects by cutting and other devices, a jury might
receive misleading and prejudicial impressions as to important issues
in a case."
Counsel for the defendant failed to take exception to the
exhibition of the pictures to the grand jury, and no question
was therefore presented for the Court to pass upon on appeal.

In the case of Denison v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co. (Nebraska, July 15, 1938), 280 N. W. 905-906, the plaintiff
recovered a verdict against the defendant railway company
in the sum of $5,000.00. In the trial of the case the plaintiff
introduced evidence, supported by medical testimony, that
he had received an injury to dorsal and cervical nerves and
injuries to his back and side and that by reason of the injuries
his salary was diminished fifty per cent, and that he was
permanently injured.
"The defendant, to offset this evidence, introduced exhibits Nos. 7
and 8, being two reels of moving pictures, which had been taken by
Felber Maasdam, an industrial cinematographer. He testified that he
spent parts of September 15, 16 and 17, 1937, taking these films, with
his camera equipped with a telescopic lens. These pictures show the
plaintiff around the stockyards, engaged in various activities. The
operator was instructed to run the projection machine, to show the
normal speed of the movements of the plaintiff, before the jury, not
faster or slower. The plaintiff is shown on top of a runway, opening
a gate, driving three cows, closing the gate, carrying hay, putting it in
feed troughs, inspecting stock, and other movements.
"The operator on cross-examination testified he was paid $1.50 an
hour and some other expenses for taking the pictures, and $25 a day
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for running them for the jury in court. He testified that, so far as he
knew, the plaintiff had no knowledge that these motion pictures were
being taken during the parts of three days while they were being 'shot.'
"The use of moving pictures for the purpose of proving certain
facts before the jury is a matter that should be left largely to the
judgment and discretion of the trial judge. State v. United Railways &
Electric Co., 162 Md. 404, 159 A. 916, 83 A. L. R. 1307."
The above is the only statement and ruling of the court
upon the admission of the motion pictures.
It is interesting to note, however, the Court in this case
ordered a remittitur, and ordered the plaintiff to remit
$1,000.00, of the amount recovered.
Reference is now made to the cases where the Court ad,mitted motion pictures in evidence or where the motion pictures were offered in evidence and the trial Court refused to
admit them, and the Supreme Court reversed the trial Court
by reason of the refusal to admit the pictures. The first
case on this subject is the case of Boyarsky v. G. J. Zimmerman Corp., 270 N. Y. S. 134, 137 (March 16, 1934).
"To disprove the plaintiff's testimony as to his physical condition,
the appellant offered in evidence certain moving pictures taken in
Bridgeport, Conn., eleven months after the accident. The pictures
were taken without the knowledge of the plaintiff, and the appellant
argues that they show that the plaintiff's claim that he was physically
incapable of working was untrue. The reason advanced by the court
for refusing to allow the motion pictures in evidence was not sufficient
to warrant their rejection. The appellant says that motion pictures
were admitted in evidence and permission granted for the projection
of pictures in the federal court and also in a recent case in the Supreme
Court, First Department, which latter case was settled before the
trial was concluded. The appellant argues that if a still photograph
of the plaintiff is admissible there is no reason for rejecting a moving
picture showing the plaintiff walking along the public highway carrying
a parcel or bundle. A sharp issue of fact involving the physical condition of the plaintiff having been presented on the trial, the so-called
moving pictures were very material on that point.
"The admissibility in evidence of moving pictures has been before
the courts of this state several times and there appears to be very
decided and divergent views with reference to their admission in
evidence.
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"In view of the claim of the plaintiff that he was totally disabled
and unable to work or earn a living at any useful employment this
case is a striking illustration of an instance where moving pictures
are not only admissible but very important. It may be that there are
many cases where moving pictures should not be allowed in evidence.
In no case should they be admitted unless a proper foundation has
been laid therefor. In most cases the question should be left largely
to the discretion of the trial judge. If a trial is to be unduly delayed
by exhibiting moving pictures, the court may very properly refuse to
permit such a delay. If moving pictures are sensational only and
unnecessary, the court should refuse to permit such evidence, particularly
where the facts may be described or the evidence submitted in another
form and thus avoid the delay and difficulty which will result from
their introduction. If their use is solely for the purpose of advertisement or in an effort to obtain publicity, they should not be allowed in
evidence.
"Several cases have been cited where evidence of moving pictures
has been properly rejected. In these cases the purpose was shown to
be merely sensational. Where there is no need of such pictures, as in
several of the cases adverted to, the trial court is within its right in
rejecting such testimony.
"In the present case the defendant appellant properly points out
that the pictures taken of the plaintiff, who contends that he received
very severe injuries, will show that he went to live in another city and
there evidently conducted himself as a perfectly well man instead of
the invalid which he claimed to be. It is argued that these moving
pictures should be shown to the jury so that it may intelligently pass
upon the question whether the condition claimed to exist is real or
feigned.
"The well-known progress being made in the moving picture world
has resulted in great accuracy in depicting the true conditions sought
to be shown. The mechanical means of perfecting such pictures has
become so general it may be necessary in the near future to frequently
permit their introduction in evidence. In many cases the pictures
may not only have a bearing upon the facts, but may be absolutely
decisive of the issues involved in the action. Their remarkable accuracy
is now generally acknowledged through their constant use as a means
of recording and publishing news items of interest to the public, and
for that purpose they are featured daily in many of the moving picture
theaters of the world.
"While it is true that in Gibson v. Gunn, 206 App. Div. 464, 202
N. Y. S. 19, the attempted introduction of moving pictures was rejected,
that case illustrates the fact that there may be a great abuse of this
form of evidence if it is permitted when wholly unnecessary or when
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simply cumulative. It may be, as the court said, that to admit such
a picture in evidence would bring 'before the jury irrelevant matter,
hearsay and incompetent evidence' and tend 'to make a farce of the
trial.' This would be particularly true if a dialogue or conversation
were permitted at the time the moving picture is presented.
"In AlMassachusetts Bonding & Insurance Go. v. Worthy (Tex. Civ.
App.), 9 S. W. (2d) 388, the court considered a similar proposition
and refused to allow moving pictures in evidence upon the ground
that such pictures are so very deceptive they can be presented in a
manner to exaggerate the conditions which are sought to be presented
to the jury. Of course, all of the necessary precautions should be
taken to see that the proper foundation is laid for the introduction of
such a moving picture, and, if there is any exaggeration, it may be
pointed out by the court or the moving picture wholly rejected.
"In State v. United Railways & Electric Co., 162 Md. 404, 418, 159
A. 916, 921, 83 A. L. R. 1307, the court said: 'When moving
pictures might and might not be used advantageously and properly
in placing the facts before juries is a question the answer to which
must vary with one case and another, and we think the decision in
each case must be left largely to the judgment and discretion of the
presiding judge, without any restricting general formula laid down
to control him.'
"A preliminary examination by the trial judge may be necessary in
some cases to determine the admissibility of such evidence. In Field
v. Gowdy, 199 Mass. 568, 574, 85 N. E. 884, 886, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.)
236, Rugg, J., writing for the court said: 'A photograph has no
higher character as evidence than the experiment itself. Whether the
conditions were sufficiently similar to make the observation of any
value in aiding the jury to pass upon the issue submitted to them was
primarily for the trial judge to determine as a matter of discretion.
His decision in this respect will not be interfered with unless plainly
wrong.'
"In Everson v. Casualty Co. of America 208 Mass. 214, 219, 94
N. E. 459, 461, the court said: 'The general rule respecting the
admission of photographs, plans and models is that whether they are
to be received or not is a preliminary question resting largely, though
not entirely, in the discretion of the trial judge, whose duty is primarily to determine whether there is sufficient similarity between what
is offered and the original which is the subject of inquiry to make
it of any assistance to the jury in passing upon the issue before them.
While this is not wholly a matter of discretion with the trial court
and his discretion is not unlimited, his action will not be revised
unless it appears to have been plainly wrong or in disregard of some
rule of law governing the rights of the parties. As was stated by
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Chief Justice Gray in Blair v. Inhabitants of Pelham, 118 Mass. 420:
'A plan or picture, whether made by the hand of man or by photography,
is admissible in evidence if verified by proof that it is a true representation of the subject to assist the jury in understanding the case.'
"In Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.), vol. 2, p. 108, Sec. 798, the
matter is very fully considered, and it is there stated:
" 'No general rule can be laid down as to the kinds of occurrences,
artificially reconstructed, in which the moving picture would have a
special risk of misleading.
" '(b) But where the moving picture is taken without artificial
reconstruction, i. e., at the time and place of the original event (a possibility not infrequent), it lacks the above element of weakness and is
entitled to be admitted on the same principles as still photographs.
The only circumstance then to be considered is that in a few matters,
such as speed and direction of human movement, or relative size in
the focus, the multiple nature of the films requires special allowances
of error to be made but these allowances are no different in kind from
the elements of error inherent under certain conditions in still photographs.'
"Based on the rule there stated, it seems to us that the moving
picture which the defendant sought to introduce in the present case
was admissible providing the requisite precautions were followed by
the justice presiding at the trial. If such moving pictures have any
tendency to exaggerate any of the true features which are sought to be
proved by the introduction thereof, that situation may be met and
properly disposed of by the court. When proper safeguards are folpictures.
loWed, no harm can come from the introduction of s'tich
"Our attention has be~n called to the case of Algeri v. Gleveland R.
Co. (Cleveland Common Pleas, May 13, 1920), cited in Wigmore on
Evidence, suprd. That was a personal injury action. To disprov6 the
plaintiff's alliged incapacity, a moving picture of the plaintiff at work
as a bricklayer, taken aftr the date of the injury, was r'edeived in
evidence.
"That case is strikingly similar to the one now under consideration.
While we do not believe a moving picture of the location of the place
of the accident taken after the accident should be admitted in evidence
unless it can be shown without question that the conditions are identical
with those existing at the time of the accident, we hold that moving
pictures of this plaintiff taken while walking aldng a public street may
be admitted in evidence.
"It follows, therefore, that, in view of the error committed by the
court in refusing to admit in evidence the testimony of Michael Birnbaum and in refusing fo allow the pfojection of moving pictuies, the
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judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with
costs to the appellant to abide the event."
On June 9, 1937, the Supreme Court of California decided
the case of Heiman v. Market St. Ry. Co., 69 Pac. (2d)
178, 180. The quotation from this case is as follows:
"After Mrs. Heiman became convalescent, she went to Palo Alto
for the purpose of rest and to further recuperate. During the period
she was at Palo Alto she claimed to have been so debilitated, sick, sore,
and nervous, as to be a confirmed invalid. As a part of its case, the
defendant introduced a set of moving pictures. They purported to
show Mrs. Heiman's movements in Palo Alto; to show her driving
an automobile in and out of heavy traffic; and to show her shopping,
walking, stooping, and bending without assistance from any one.
They also showed her carrying grocery bundles. The testimony showed
that the pictures were taken in August, about two and a half months
after the injury occurred. The plaintiffs contend no foundation was
laid, but they do not show in what respect it was not laid. The
plaintiffs go further and contend that in no instance should moving
pictures be received in evidence. This contention is based on the fact
that numerous 'pranks and tricks' may be developed on the screen.
The same contention can be made regarding many classes of evidence.
The record before us does not disclose that the reels were examined
and it was disclosed they had been altered in any respect. But when,
as here, testimony is introduced to the effect that the picture is a true
representation of the scene as witnessed by the photographer, the
objections mentioned are without foundation. That photographs may
be admitted in evidence will hardly be questioned (10 Cal. Jur. 896) ;
that moving pictures are but a series of single pictures is known to
every one. If single pictures may properly be received in evidence, it
is difficult to see any reason why moving pictures may not be, and at
the present time the general rule is that they may be. Boyarsky v.
G. A. Zimmerman Corp., 240 App. Div. 361, 270 N. Y. S. 134, 137;
Wigmore's 1934 Supplement to his work on Evidence, p. 339. It has
been held that under certain circumstances moving pictures should not
be received in evidence. State of Maryland for Use of Chima v. United
Rys. & Elec. Co., 162 Md. 404, 159 A. 916, 83 A. L. R. 1307. In
that case and cases there cited, it will be noted that under the facts a
still picture would not have been admitted in evidence. However, in
162 Md. at page 418, 159 A. at page 921, 83 A. L. R. at page 1315,
the Supreme Court of Maryland said: 'When moving pictures might
and might not be used advantageously and properly in placing the facts
before juries is a question the answer to which must vary with one case
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and another, and we think the decision in each case must be left largely
to the judgment and discretion of the presiding judge, without any
restricting general formula laid down to control him.' In the instant
case we think it is clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the moving pictures to be exhibited to the jury. Moreover,
while the plaintiffs objected to the moving pictures when offered by
the defendant, on a later date they caused the pictures to be exhibited
again to the jury. By doing so, they waived their objection. In re
Estate of Visaxis, 95 Cal. App. 617, 625, 273, p. 165. At no time did
they question the truth of the portrayals. We think the trial court
did not err in admitting the pictures in evidence and furthermore
that on the record as made the plaintiffs are in no position to complain."
On June 30, 1937, the Supreme Court of Florida de-

cided the case of Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Stossel, 175 So. 804805; in this case the appellee contended he had received injuries which resulted in total disability. The appellant contended that no such disability had been incurred as the result
of an accidental injury.
"In support of its contention, appellant exhibited here and in the
court below some moving picture films. We have not before been
called on to rule on the challenge to this class of evidence. We hold
that such evidence is admissible, but to be so, it must be produced under
the direction of a commissioner appointed by the court for that purpose.
Opposing counsel should also have notice and an opportunity to be
present and the application to take it must make it appear to the trial
court that it is material and will enlighten the court on the issues
involved. Otherwise it should not be admitted."
The same case, before the Supreme Court of Florida, on
February 4, 1938, on a petition for rehearing, 179 So. 163,
quoting from the opinion as follows:
"The petition for rehearing is directed to that part of the court's
opinion reading as follows:
" 'In support of its contention, appellant exhibited here and in the
court below some moving picture films. We have not before been
called on to rule on the challenge to this class of evidence. We hold
that such evidence is admissible but to be so it must be produced under
the direction of a commissioner appointed by the court for that purpose. Opposing counsel should also have notice and an opportunity
to be present and the application to take it must make it appear to
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the trial court that it is material and will enlighten the court on the
issues involved. Otherwise it should not be admitted.'
"This procedure for admitting moving picture films in evidence
grew out of charges and counter-charges of bad faith on the part of
counsel with reference to the verity of the evidence or films in question. On further consideration, we are convinced that the procedure
so prescribed should not be required in all cases.
"We do not renounce the requirement as to notice and the production of such evidence under the direction of a commissioner. We think
it the proper procedure in many cases, but if in the judgment of either
litigant the notice and appointment of a commissioner should not be
availed of, the litigant may proceed in the manner deemed by him
advisable, but to be competent evidence, the films must be properly
authenticated and shown to be a faithful representation of the subject, sound, movement, or other tangible or intangible thing which
they purport to reproduce. When such a showing is made to the
trial court, moving picture films should be admitted under the same
rules as photographs."
It will be observed, from an examination of the cases cited,
that where the pictures were introduced in evidence or where
the case was reversed by reason of the failure of the lower
court to introduce the pictures in evidence, in each instance,
the defendant offered the pictures in evidence. The plaintiff
was permitted to introduce motion pictures in evidence in
a personal injury case, the case of Rogers v. City of Detroit,
Department of Street Railways (Mich., June 5, 1939), 286
N. W. 167.
One of the questions presented on appeal for decision is as
follows:
"(2) Was it prejudicial to permit the jury to view motion pictures
of the rapid pulsation of plaintiff's throat?"
The following quotation from the opinion answers the
question in the affirmative:
"The second question has to do with the admission of moving
pictures that were taken in plaintiff's home showing the rapid pulsation of plaintiff's throat. Counsel agreed that it would be dangerous
to bring Mrs. Rogers to the court room. Testimony had already been
received of her condition, but the court felt the jury would better
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understand that condition if the moving pictures were shown. The
trial judge investigated the circumstances and conditions under which
they were made and viewed them apart from the jury before admitting
them in evidence. No claim is made that they were not an accurate
portrayal of Mrs. Rogers' condition, or that the proper foundation
was not laid for their introduction. See 'Motion Pictures in Evidence,' 27 Ill. Law Rev. 424. Certain circumstances under which
motion pictures might convey an erroneous impression to a jury are
pointed out in Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 2, 2d ed., 107. The
reception of such evidence should be left largely to the judgment and
discretion of the trial judge. Heiman v. Market St. Ry. Co., 21 Cal.
App. 2d 311, 69 P. 2d 178; State to Use of Chima v. United Rys.
& Electric Co., 162 Md. 404, 159 A. 916, 83 A. L. R. 1307; and
Denison v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., Nebr., 280 N. W. 905. It
was not error to permit the jury to view these motion pictures."
The phenomenal development in the motion picture in-

dustry, which resulted in producing and exhibiting sound
pictures, has presented another interesting question for the
Courts to pass upon in the admission of evidence in the trial
of cases.

The first case upon this subject appears to be that of Commonwealth v. Harold Roller, 100 Pa. Superior Ct. 125,
(1930), and the opinion is as follows:
"OPINION

BY GAWTHROP,

J., November 20, 1930:

"Defendant appeals from five sentences of imprisonment imposed
on bills of indictment charging him with entering with intent to steal,
and larceny. The cases were tried together in the court below and
were argued together in this court. They raise but 'a single question
which will be answered in one opinion. After defendant was arrested
he confessed to the various burglaries that he had committed. His
confession was taken and recorded by a talking motion picture machine
and the record thus made, which was offered in evidence and admitted
over the objection of the defendant, was exhibited to the jury upon a
screen. The question presented to us is whether it was proper to
admit this evidence. This is the same and the only question which
was raised in the court below on the motion for a new trial. It was
answered in the affirmative by the learned trial judge in a well considered opinion which so fully justifies the conclusion reached as to
warrant our adopting considerable portions thereof. The question,
which is a new one in this state, involves two subordinate questions,
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first, the general relevancy and admissibility of such evidence; and
second, the adequacy of the authentication of the evidence offered.
"As to the general relevancy and admissibility of such evidence it
is a matter of common knowledge that motion pictures are no longer
a novelty. They are constantly used for commercial and scientific
purposes. The talking motion picture, or movieton6, as it is technically known, results merely from an adaptation of the scientiltc
processes used in producing phonographic records in order that words
spoken, or sounds produced at the time of the taking of the picture,
may be reproduced with the picture. The Commonwealth presented
the testimony of expert witnesses respecting the method by which
the talking motion pictures are made and produced and their reproductive accuracy upon the screen. From this evidence it appears that
the movietone is, in the language of the court below, 'in basic characteristics, no different, on the one hand, from ordinary photography,
in regard to the visual picture reproduced, and, on the other hand,
from phonographic records, in regard to the auditory recording of
sound. The principles that underlie their admissibility into evidence,
therefore, differ in no way from those governing the admissibility of
still pictures and phonographic records.' It would seem, therefore, that
objections to the introduction of sound pictures to supplement, clarify
and authenticate verbal testimony of witnesses must be based upon
lack of authenticity of the particular picture which is offered in evidence, rather than on the ground of the general unreliability of the
process by which such pictures are produced. From time to time the
courts have recognized new agencies for presenting evidential matters.
The novelty of the talking motion pictures is no reason for rejecting
it if its accuracy and reliability, as aids in the determinatidn of the truth,
are established. In the words of the learned trial judge, 'all knowledge
purveys tb the law, and from the domains of every art and scidnce it
draws the weapons by which it discovers truth dnd confounds error.
The still photograph, X-ray, the dictograph, the finger print, the
phonograph, the microkcope, and even the bloodhbund, have all been
used and received by judicial tribunals in the proof of matters depending upon evidence; and, in all such cases, the preliminary investigation was directed to the proper authentication of the evidence, and
not merely to the question whether imposture might be successful.' In
Afoncur v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 269 Pa. 213, photostatic copies
were admitted for comparis6n with admittedly genuine signatures. In
C. & J. Elec. Ry. Co. v. Spence, 213 Ill. 220, and Miller v. Mintun,
73 Ark. 183, X-ray photdgraphs taken by an expert were held admissible. In People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, the use of photographs
of finger prints discbvered at the scene of the crime were permitted.
In State v. Knight, 43 Nev. 131, enlarged .diakams, made by an expert, of the appehrance of blood in v'arious c5nditfofis through the
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microscope, were permitted to be used for the purpose of illuminating
the witnesses' testimony. Telephone conversations have been freely
received in evidence, upon a proper identification of the voice: Penna.
Trust Co. v. Ghriest, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 71. The dictograph has
also been recognized as a legitimate agency for the discovery of truth:
State v. Minneapolis Milk Co., 124 Minn. 34. Phonographic records
have been received in evidence. See Boyne City v. Anderson, 146 Mich.
328. See also 22 C. J. 766. These are but a few of the cases which
indicate the receptive attitude of the law toward any reliable mechanism
produced by scientific knowledge for the discovery or recording of
facts. But few reported decisions dealing with the admissibility of
motion pictures have come to our attention. In Pandolfo v. U. 8.,
286 Fed. Rep. 8, the trial court was sustained in refusing to admit
a motion picture which the defendant offered to exhibit to the jury,
the reviewing court stating that 'the question of permitting the moving
picture to be displayed before the jury was so far within the discretion
of the court that while it might not have been error to have received
it, it was not error to exclude it.' In DeCamp v. U. S., 10 Fed. Rep.,
2d Series, 984, an offer of evidence similar to that made in the Pandolfo
case was rejected and the ruling was sustained by the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia on the ground that it was for the trial
court to determine whether the picture which was offered was sufficiently verified. In Feeney v. Young, 191 N. Y. App. Div. 501, which
was a suit to recover damages for the public exhibition of a moving
picture of a patient while being operated upon, the trial court rejected
the picture on the ground that the evidence of eye-witnesses who had
seen the production and identified the individual being operated upon
it the picture as the plaintiff, was the best evidence. In Gibson v. Gunn,
206 N. Y. App. Div. 465, in a three to two decision, it was held to
have been error to admit in evidence the motion picture of the plaintiff
showing that prior to the accident resulting in the damages claimed,
he was able to perform as a vaudeville actor despite the fact that he
had an artificial leg. The decision was put upon the ground that the
evidence was hearsay and incompetent. The reasoning in support of
this conclusion seems to us to lose sight of the many principles underlying the admission of photographs and evidence of that character. In
order to make such evidence competent it must be shown that the picture
is authentic; that it reproduces an exact portrayal of the events-the
movements and the voice. When this appears to the satisfaction of the
trial judge there would seem to be no sound reason to prevent its
acceptance in evidence. As photographs and phonographic reproduction of sounds have been held to be admissible in evidence, there would
seem to be no sound reason for refusing to accept a talking moving
picture, which is but a combination of the two when it is shown to be
accurate and reliable.
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"Upon the question of whether the movietone which was offered in
evidence was a true portrayal of the actions and words of defendant
at the time it was taken, the Commonwealth offered abundant evidence
to authenticate it, and there was no countervailing proof. It was made
in the presence and under the direction of an expert who also saw the
film projected before and during the trial. When asked, 'Q. Does that
or not actually represent what occurred?' he answered, 'Yes, in every
way.' 'Q. And the production that you say, and the tones you heard
here-did they correspond with your recollection of what took place
when the picture was taken? A. Yes, sir.' The operator of the
camera and the sound man took the photograph 'synchronously and
both agreed that the projected movietone comported exactly and truthfully with the scene and the voice actually taken. Defendant's expert,
who testified that talking motion pictures are readily susceptible to
fabrication, conceded, after making a thorough examination of the
film, that there had been no elimination or insertion in the record, and
that the projected film, in his judgment, accurately reproduced the
scene taken. We conclude, therefore, that the film was sufficiently
authenticated to make it admissible in evidence.
"The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is
affirmed."

On July 9, 1937, the Supreme Court of California denied
a petition for rehearing in the case of People v. Hayes, 71
Pac. (2d) 321, 322. The opinion is as follows:
"McCoMB, Justice.
"Defendant was convicted after trial by jury of manslaughter. This
appeal is from the judgment and order, denying defendant's motion

for a new trial.
"The essential facts are these:

"During the course of the trial the court permitted a sound motion
picture of defendant making a confession to certain police officers to
be reproduced before the jury and received as evidence.
"Defendant relies for reversal of the judgment on the sole proposition that it was prejudicially erroneous for the trial court to receive
as evidence a sound motion picture of defendant making a confession
to police officers.
"This proposition is untenable. The law is settled that the confession of a defendant voluntarily made is properly received in evidence. People v. Ford, 25 Cal. App. 388, 419, 143 P. 1075; 8 Cal.

Jur. 108, Sec. 200. Hence, there is no merit in defendant's objections
that the introduction in evidence of his confession by means of a sound
moving picture was error because:
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"(1)
It denied him
(a) the right to be confronted in the presence of the court by witnesses against him,
(b) the right to cross-examine the witnesses who testified against
him,
(c) the privileges and immunity secured to him by the Constitution
of the state of California.
"(2) It was
(a) unsworn testimony.
(b) hearsay evidence.
It compelled the defendant to be a witness against himself
"(3)
contrary to the 'due process' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States of America and to the provisions
of section 13, article 1, of the Constitution of the State of California
and of section 688 of the California Penal Code and section 1323 as
amended by St. 1935, p. 1942.
"(4) It was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America.
"We are satisfied that it should, and that it stands on the same basis
as the presentation in court of a confession through any orthodox
mechanical medium, that is, there is a preliminary question to be determined by the trial judge as to whether or not the sound moving
picture is an accurate reproduction of that which it is alleged occurred.
If after a preliminary examination, the trial judge is satisfied that
the sound moving picture reproduces accurately that which has been
said and done, and the other requirements relative to the admissibility
of a confession are present, i. e., it was freely and voluntarily made
without hope of immunity 6r promise of rewvard, then, not 6nly should
the pfeliminary foundation and the sound moving picture go to the
jury, but, in keeping with the policy of the courts to avail themselves
of each and eiery aid of science for the piipose of astertaining the
truth, such practice is to be commended as of inestimable Value to
triers of fact in reaching accurate conclusions.
"This particular case well illustrates the advantage to be gained by
courts' utilizing modern methods of science in ascertaining facts. The
objection is frequently heard in criminal trials that a defendant's confession has not been freely and voluntarily made, he testifying that it
was induced either by threats or force oit under the hope or promise
of immunity or reward, which is denied by witnesses on behalf of the
People. When a confession is presented by means of a movietone the
trial court is enabled to determine more accufately the tfuth or falsity
of such claims and rule accdfdingly.
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"The conclusion we have reached finds support in Commonwealth v.
Roller (1930), 100 Pa. Super. 125. The court in this case held on a
similar state of facts that a movietone confession of a defendant was
properly received in evidence. See, also, Wigmore on Evidence,
volume II (second Edition), p. 109, wherein that learned author says:
'But where the moving picture is taken without artificial reconstruction,
i.e., at the time and place of the original event (a possibility not infrequent), it lacks the above element of weakness, and is entitled to be
admittedon the same principles as still photographs. The only circumstance then to be considered is that in a few matters, such a speed and
direction of human movement, or relative size in the focus, the multiple
nature of the films requires special allowances of error to be made;
but these allowances are no different in kind from the elements of error
inherent under certain conditions in still photographs.'
"For the foregoing reasons the judgment and order are, and each is,
affirmed."

The foundation to be established by the evidence, prior

to the introduction of motion pictures in evidence, has been
fully explained by the decisions cited, and does not require
further elucidation.
In order, however, to make this paper more practical,

(based on actual experience in the trial of a case where he
introduced such evidence for the defendant), the writer
desires to call your attention to what he believes will suffice
to establish the foundation for the introduction of sound and

motion pictures in evidence:
First: The photographer should be required to explain
in detail the kind of camera used in taking pictures, the make

of camera, the film used, the lens, whether telescopic or
otherwise, the speed (number of frames per second), and

further describe the mechanism, that is, the method in taking
the pictures.

Second: The photographer should describe in detail the
object being photographed. In the case where the injured
party is being photographed at a time subsequent to the
injury, the action of the injured party should be described in
detail. If some other object, whether it was moving or still,
and particularly describe the object and each movement.
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Third: The photographer should describe his location
when taking the picture. It is necessary to show that the
object photographed was correctly photographed, that the
picture correctly represents the object photographed, the
actions, if any, and the speed or movement of the object.
Fourth: The photographer should then show whether or
not he developed the film. If he did not develop it, it should
be traced in such a manner to show that no deletions or additions were made after the picture was taken and during
the time it was being developed.
Fifth: The photographer should project the picture after
its development and show that no additions or deletions were
made in the picture from the time it was taken until it was
developed, and that the picture, at the time it is offered in
evidence, since its development, correctly represents the object
photographed.
Sixth: The picture (in form of film) itself should be identified as an exhibit in the case. If more than one roll of film
is used, it is suggested each roll be designated as a separate
exhibit. With this preliminary foundation established, the
picture should be introduced in evidence.1

PROJECTION OR EXHIBITING PICTURES TO THE JURY

It is necessary to establish a foundation before the pictures
can be projected or exhibited to the jury. The following is
a suggested method for establishing the foundation:
First: Evidence should be introduced showing the technical
qualifications of the operator of the projector, a detailed
description of the projector and its mechanism should be
shown by the evidence, the method of projection or exhibition,
the speed at which the picture will be shown. A showing
should be made that the exhibition of the picture to the jury
will not exaggerate or minimize the actions of the object
photographed, and that the projection or exhibition of the
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MOTION PICTURES IN EVIDENCE

pictures to the jury will correctly show the object as photographed, in reference to the actions and speed of the object.
Second: The operator of the projector should examine the
film before he undertakes to exhibit it to the jury for the
purpose of ascertaining whether there has been any deletions
or additions to the film, and for the further purpose of determining whether or not the film can be projected at the same
rate of speed (number of frames per second) at which the
picture was taken, and that the picture correctly portrays the
object and shows the conditions as they existed at the time
the picture was taken, and that it can be exhibited without
any distortion or misrepresentation.
Third: In exhibiting motion pictures to the jury, it is
possible to have the projecting device stopped at a given
point for the purpose of additional examination of a witness
or for additional cross-examination of the witness, to explain
the picture, if such evidence is competent.
As observed from an examination of the above authorities,
when the proper foundation is established by the evidence,
motion and sound pictures are competent in evidence.
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